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*V. 215*

2 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: OCI Area Chiefs  
SUBJECT : NIS Shortfalls

1. The recent timetable slippages in OCI's NIS production have been sufficiently alarming to produce a direct demarche from D/OBI to D/OCI. An examination of our performance during the past several months reveals that D/OBI's concern is justified. Delinquencies and shortfalls were detected in all Areas, although the problem has been more severe in some than in others. Moreover, the slow pace of some drafts now in process but not yet at deadline suggest that we are doing little to correct an ailment that appears to be becoming chronic.

2. All Area Chiefs shall immediately take steps to:

a. Unclog insofar as possible any NIS sections now in process which would appear to be falling behind or are otherwise in difficulty. Overtime will not be granted to clear these jams except by direct authorization of the D/OCI or DD/OCI. However, the Area Chief's authority is quite sufficient to move personnel, use directed assignments, and particularly to revise priorities for other items under production.

b. Reexamine the Area's production overall with the aim of assuring fulfillment of the NIS commitment on a timely basis. In some cases this may mean the postponement or cancellation of Area-initiated projects which absorb significant amounts of Area manpower. All Area initiated projects requiring more than an estimated one work week of one analyst will henceforth be brought before the D/OCI's bi-monthly production panel for approval.

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c. Identify those personnel whose performance persistently involves extensive rewrites and time-consuming duplication of effort. Such personnel should either be re-assigned to other duties, retrained if that is feasible, or their names submitted to the CSB for consideration as to whether they are surplus to OCI needs.

3. The analyst is not always at fault for missing deadlines. I am convinced that more effective supervision can produce significant progress. Effective supervision must begin with the personal interest and involvement of the Area Division and Branch Chief in the NIS problem. Henceforth, Fitness Reports on all line supervisors will explicitly reflect their performance in meeting NIS standards and deadlines.




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Director of Current Intelligence

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Publications Support Branch.

V 266

2 August 1967

NIS PERFORMANCE IN OCIPlans + Technology Officer

1. OCI misses nearly four out of five NIS deadlines. General opinion attributes the dismal record to an incompatible marriage. Current intelligence and NIS research are said to call on disparate producer talents and to serve contrasting consumer interests.

2. The dissimilarities between the two types of effort do not of themselves make a case for divorce. They do, however, suggest the importance of management doctrines and control procedures in NIS research that are not mere extensions of those applied for current intelligence production.

Need for More Centralized Controls

3. The work process in current intelligence is synchronized with the flow of incoming documents and with the demands of daily or other short-term deadlines. The work process itself imposes constraints against slippage and poor quality. The constraints are effective because the penalties for failure are immediate rather than distant. The penalties for failure are reinforced by a gratifyingly high probability of reward for success in the form of kudos and other recognition from the higher echelons. Current intelligence thus takes on the attributes of a self-adjusting profit and loss economy that is rationally governed by near laissez-faire management principles.

4. OCI cannot count on such forces for self-adjustment in the case of NIS production. The work is not virtually self-scheduling, nor is work discipline ensured by virtually self-regulating pressures on the OCI areas to keep up with continuous raw-material and finished-product flows. The D/OCI cannot therefore concede to his subordinate line echelons the same latitude in NIS as in current intelligence production.

Areas of Management Weakness

5. The lines of control he must establish are in five problem areas:

- a. Quality of Research Personnel: One of the more pernicious propositions of received doctrine is that good current intelligence officers

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make poor researchers and that good basic intelligence producers are rarely good at current reporting. The generalization has been made the rationale for a track system in OCI that channels the less proficient analysts into NIS production. How is a career-trainee with no area background to cut his teeth as an analyst? Let him do an NIS. What is a supervisor to do with a senior drudge? Put him on NIS research.

In point of fact, proficiency in current intelligence and in research more often than not go hand in hand. The D/OCI himself is as good testimony as there is in OCI to the congruity of current intelligence aptitude and research skills in the same person. The close scrutiny which hiring officers in OCI give to college theses and other studies written by applicants further attests to the transferability of verbal facility and substantive knowledge from research to current intelligence assignments.

The record of NIS production itself shows that the better NIS jobs in OCI are usually done by those who are also the better analysts in current intelligence. The few exceptions to the rule do not invalidate the rule. The NIS program will be better off when it gets a larger share of the better analysts in OCI--that is to say, a smaller share of the "NIS types."

- b. Quantity of Research Personnel: The Five Year Plan for OCI envisages no increase in the TO for NIS production. No increase is necessary.

What is necessary is equitable allocation of the available personnel. The Soviet Internal Affairs Branch, [ ] analysts, is doing one NIS General Survey in Fiscal 1968; NIS will be accounting for [ ] of analyst man hours available during the year. By contrast, the West Africa Branch, with [ ] analysts must do five General Surveys and two Section 57s (Subversion and Insurgency) in Fiscal 1968; the analyst man hours required for NIS

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production will amount to [redacted] analyst man hours available in the branch. The percentage required by West Africa Branch will be even higher in Fiscal 1969.

The figures are not intended to imply that the proportion of man hours in NIS production is the fair measure of burden on the geographic-area offices of OCI. The high-priority given to intelligence on Communist areas justifies a disproportionately high ratio of current intelligence to NIS coverage of those areas. OCI is, however, bound by USIB-directed publication commitments as well as by guidelines set by intelligence priority objectives. The publication commitments must be accepted as constraints on the distribution of personnel resources among the geographic offices.

- c. Prestige: NIS came to OCI from origins of rejection and disesteem. The Director of INR was determined to make State intelligence a more "policy-oriented" effort. NIS research did not contribute to the image he sought, and he rid himself of the obligation.

The NIS researchers came eventually to OCI, where they encountered much the same uncharitable view of their usefulness. OCI line management grudgingly took on NIS research as a subsidiary production effort. The perceptive researcher can continue to take his cues from the D/OCI, who makes it a point to chair a CIB panel meeting every now and then. What researcher expects the D/OCI to display the same personal interest in NIS production? What researcher, for that matter, expects to have his work read, in draft or published form, by any OCI supergrade?

- d. Incentive Patterns: The path to promotion into line supervisory jobs in OCI is by way of distinguished performance in the current intelligence program, not in NIS research. The ambitious analyst in OCI gets out of NIS production. If impressed into NIS work, he tries to keep one hand

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in current intelligence while he is writing his NIS sections.

Again, this view of the career ladder is reinforced by the example set by higher authority. The Arab-Israeli task force can count on commendation by the DDI--a written memorandum extending his personal "well-done." Such compliments are the rule for outstanding effort in current intelligence. They are not extended for NIS research.

The bias in the pattern of incentives would be less damaging to the NIS effort if the OCI careerist's "payoff table" included a due share of counterbalancing penalties. The periodic fitness report offers an opportunity to penalize line management for inattentiveness to the NIS program. Other forms of reprimand are also available, also seldom used.

- e. Management Style: Within each geographic area of OCI, the lines of guidance for NIS research usually run from the area's special research assistant to the analysts working on the NIS sections. Some branch chiefs effectively review the work of NIS researchers before it is passed to the special assistant. Other branch chiefs, concentrating on current intelligence, leave the review task entirely to the special assistant. Division and area chiefs, scrupulous as they are in prior review of important current intelligence, rarely have occasion to read NIS sections in draft (or after publication).

Line management in OCI typically allocates work assignment with only secondary regard to impact on NIS deadlines. A special research assistant will be directed to take over in the absence of the press officer, with no inquiry made about NIS backlogs. A division chief will frankly express indifference to NIS slippage that is to result from putting an NIS researcher to work on a Special Article for the OCI Weekly.

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Recommendations

6. There is no certainty that the remedies recommended below can be applied successfully within the present organizational structure of OCI. A first effort at reform within this structural framework is urged, however, because the present structure does offer prospective advantages in more efficient use of manpower. A single manpower pool for NIS research and current intelligence minimizes waste from idle time between projects, from use of separate file systems, and from dependency on separate information control services. To judge by the size of the old Research Division, a separate division or area for NIS research in OCI would probably require substantially more professionals and clericals than are presently used by OCI in the NIS program.

7. The following recommendations are grounded in an assumption, to be proved or refuted by events in the coming months, that OCI's shortcomings have been primarily in remediable areas of management policy. Hopefully but far from certainly, management reforms will obviate the added expense of structural reorganization.

Recommendation No. 1--EXPERIENCE IN NIS RESEARCH IS TO BE ESTABLISHED AS AN ADVANTAGEOUS RUNG ON THE OCI CAREER LADDER.

Ambitious military men seek line command assignments because experience in line commands contributes to career advance. Good OCI analysts will seek rather than shun an occasional assignment in NIS research when they believe the experience will contribute similarly to their career progress.

Quite apart from the appeal to private ambition, OCI as an organization will benefit when line managers are selected from the ranks of those who have taken their turns at NIS research. OCI's inadequacies in management of its NIS program are due in part to the inexperience of line managers in NIS production and to resulting rationalizations which minimize the importance of NIS production in OCI.

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Recommendation No. 2--QUALITY CRITERIA WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO GUIDE LINE MANAGEMENT IN ITS ASSIGNMENT OF ANALYSTS TO NIS RESEARCH

NIS research is not to be viewed as a training ground for CTs or a dumping ground for time-servers.

Unless he comes to OCI with impressive background on a country, a career trainee should have a year's experience in OCI before he is put to the task of writing an NIS.

The experienced analyst should be assigned to NIS production only if he has a creditable record in meeting deadlines. A consistent record of poor performance in NIS production, in particular, should disqualify any experienced analyst from further NIS assignments.

The Special Assistant for Research need not have a veto power over analyst assignments, but area chiefs will wish to refer to the Special Assistant's records of analyst past performance.

Recommendation No. 3--PRESENT TABLES OF ORGANIZATION NOTWITHSTANDING, ANALYSTS WILL BE TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED AS NECESSARY TO ASSURE FULFILLMENT OF OCI'S NIS COMMITMENTS.

The Middle East and Africa Divisions are the most delinquent in meeting NIS deadlines. Less than 10 percent of NIS production in Middle East Division and less than 4 percent in Africa Division met deadline dates in Fiscal 1967.

In one case last year, an analyst from European Area was assigned to help with NIS production in Africa Division. Further recourse to such directed assignments will be necessary in Fiscal 1968.

Directed temporary assignments are stop-gaps. In some cases they may suggest the need for permanent TO changes. West Africa Branch's NIS load will engross [ ] available branch manpower in Fiscal 1969 unless the branch gets more analysts.

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Recommendation No. 4--AREA CHIEFS IN OCI WILL SUBMIT MONTHLY REPORTS THAT EXPLAIN THE REASONS FOR TIME SLIPPAGE IN NIS PRODUCTION AND GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF CORRECTIVE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN.

The reports to the D/OCI will be in addition to the comments made monthly in the report from the Special Assistant for Research.

To the extent that the reports from line management are embarrassments to those who sign them, the reports will hopefully serve as prods to self-improvement. When self-improvement is not the result, the reports will prod the D/OCI to institute his own corrective measures.

These corrective measures will include evaluations in fitness reports and frank interim appraisals in written memorandum or private interviews with area chiefs. The prods of the D/OCI are critically important; lacking D/OCI reiterations of his seriousness of purpose, his new demands on line management will be mistaken for pro forma exhortation.

Recommendation No. 5--CONTROLS ARE TO BE ENFORCED OVER AREA-INITIATED CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS TO ENSURE AGAINST DEFAULT ON NIS COMMITMENTS.

OCI has already instituted some controls in line with this recommendation.

OCI's most important responsibility is for current intelligence. This does not, however, mean that everything under the current intelligence rubric is more important than NIS research. Nor does it exempt OCI management from the effort to man even the urgent current intelligence task in a way that minimizes damage to the NIS effort.

Requests for D/OCI approval of area-initiated projects should include estimates of manpower required and size of publication that will result.

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Duty schedules for substitute press officer, night SIDO, production assistant, and similar assignments should exempt personnel working on NIS backlogs.

Recommendation No. 6--SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE BY NIS RESEARCHERS IS TO BE MADE A MATTER OF RECORD IN ADDITION TO COMMENDATORY NOTICE IN FITNESS REPORTS.

- A "well-done" from the D/OCI is urged, either in personal interview with the analyst or in written memorandum. The objective would be to correct the impression, now common in the ranks, that NIS research does nothing to bring the NIS researcher to the attention of the people who really count in OCI.

Recommendation No. 7--APPROPRIATE SIGNS OF STATUS AND PRESTIGE ARE TO BE EXTENDED TO THE NIS EFFORT IN OCI.

- The status symbols of the Special Assistant for Research reflect OCI's attitude toward the NIS program. He should be rescued as soon as possible from his dungeon on the ground floor. He is much farther away physically from the D/OCI than any other OCI intelligence officer in headquarters building. He does not now have his own private office.

Overtime may seem an odd sort of status symbol, but it does nevertheless suggest importance in an office that condones overtime only for priority tasks. OCI's budget presently precludes increases in OCI overtime payments, but NIS researchers should be encouraged to apply for compensatory time in recompense for overtime work to meet deadline dates.

The Longer Run

8. The recommendations, if implemented, will serve immediate ends of management efficiency. Measures to improve efficiency in OCI, however, will be in continuing struggle with a widespread cynicism about the value of NIS in relation to cost. While the D/OCI moves energetically to get the job in hand done, he can serve a cause of equal importance by suggesting, in the proper forums, the job that ought to be in hand.

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9. One suggestion would proceed from his observation that at least 90 percent of what is printed in an NIS General Survey is unclassified information, useful for general orientation but rarely for providing the depth of detail needed by the specialist in intelligence or operational planning. Proposals to contract out the research and writing have been opposed on grounds that they would vitiate management controls and entail even higher costs than are involved in doing the work in-house.

10. A variant proposal would not require any contracts with outside researchers. The proposal would involve only assurance to publishers of a market in the government for books prepared in the general format of the General Survey. The publishers would continue to make their own arrangements with authors, would continue to capitalize on the imperatives in the academic world which motivate scholars to achieve distinction by publication.

11. Drexel Godfrey's The Government of France is an example of the kind of work the publisher could have had modified to conform to NIS format. The publisher could have used the NIS or other format in his sales to the commercial market. He could have hired either one author or one editor to put together chapters signed by different authors.

12. If the government paid ten dollars per paperback volume for 1,000 volumes, the cost would run the government no more than a fifth of what is paid out to publish equivalent information in the General Survey. The profit motive would be an inducement for frequent update and adherence to standards; the publisher needs to have only a reasonably good chance of realizing his \$10,000 minimum sale. He would not of course be putting out "national intelligence," and if the label rather than the substance is the essential thing, then the D/OCI can only move on to another suggestion.

13. That suggestion might be to change the updating process. It would no longer be the painful process of complete rewrite but only the revision of text segments. Segmental revision would in most cases be occasioned by the very developments that get reported in current intelligence publications.

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14. Revisions could be published and disseminated as they are made, although it would be desirable also to incorporate all revisions in a new book every so often. For those who kept revisions when issued, there should be a system of notices--perhaps periodic issuances of revised tables of contents--enabling recipients to check that they were in receipt of all the latest revisions. More than counterbalancing this and other problems, segmental revision would bring important compensating advantages:

- a. The logic of having NIS production in OCI would be reinforced, since NIS updates would often be near by-products of current intelligence coverage. The conflict of managerial interest between basic and current intelligence production in OCI would be reduced.
- b. Utilization of analyst manpower in OCI would be more efficient. Line management would not find it necessary so often to detail manpower out of current intelligence to a four or six month stint in NIS research. Rarely would any task of segmental revision occasion more work than does the writing of a Special Article for the OCI Weekly.
- c. OBI's pains in putting out the General Survey would be diminished. The entire publication would not be held up so often because of a missed deadline by one contributor.
- d. The prestige and value of the NIS General Survey would be enhanced by its reputation for being up to date.
- e. The cellular structuring of the NIS would facilitate the preparation of computer-based data banks of basic intelligence. The NIS publication is going to be put on magnetic tape, in any event, as a stage in the printing process. The magnetically-stored text may as well be segmented in records that can be individually retrieved by computer-based query, say under COINS (Community On-Line Information System). The advantage

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
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of quick access through computers to segments of the text does not of course preclude printout at any time of the entire publication for use by embassies and other installations abroad not directly linked to the COINS network.

15. The low prestige of the NIS, its generally unappreciative readership, and the antipathetic attitude of many producers will continue to inspire suggestions for a general systems overhaul. The future prospect of radical change does not diminish the importance of near-term reforms within OCI. Its own inefficiencies are grave reflections on the managerial talent of OCI, and its self-interest is primarily in improving its own house as the first order of business.

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Plans and Technology Officer  
Office of Current Intelligence

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31 August 1967

SUBJECT: OCI Manpower Expended in the Office's Research Program


1. OCI's research program costs approximately 50 - 51½ man-years of work, about 44 - 45 of which is professional and the remainder typist and other non-professional manpower. The manpower costs are divided among the OCI research overhead (the five Area or Division Research Assistants and the three professionals and one secretary in the office of the SA/R/OCI) and the four main products (NIS Sections--General Survey sections and section 57; NIS Factbook; OCI Country Handbooks; and OCI Research Papers) which are SA/R/OCI responsibilities. These figures do not include the manpower costs of producing those of the Intelligence Memorandums, Handbooks (other than Country Handbooks) or other publications that are basically research papers but which do not come within the purview of the SA/R/OCI. The calculation also excludes certain other types of overhead necessary for research but common to all OCI activity (e.g., information control, file, maintenance).

2. NIS Sections--OCI's NIS commitment has stabilized at three sections each for some 30-31 General Surveys and 12 section 57's (Subversion and Insurgency) yearly. On a rule-of-thumb basis we calculate that each General Survey costs OCI about 200 professional man-days and each section 57 about 120, exclusive of the OCI research overhead. The professional manpower cost, therefore, is 7440 - 7640 man-days or 35 - 36 man-years (assuming 212 man-days to a man-year). The non-professional manpower cost has been calculated at 1100 - 1200 man-hours or 5 - 5½ man-years for the yearly typing load, again exclusive of the research overhead. When we are able to handle the bulk of the NIS typing load in Publications Support using the MIST, the non-professional manpower cost will be reduced a little over one man-year.

3. NIS Factbook--OCI is responsible for semi-annual contributions amounting to about a dozen and a half items on some 173 countries, colonial areas, or overseas territories. This is more an annoyance than a substantial drain on manpower, since these are nearly all items which need to be kept up to date for current intelligence purposes. In all, excluding the research overhead, the chore for the professionals probably totals to little more than 1/3 of a man-year with little or no non-professional time involved.

4. OCI Country Handbooks--The country handbook program is now primarily a maintenance problem with only one or two of the originally projected series still to appear for the first time. There is no schedule for updating, the number and timing of the work being largely dependent on developments in each country and the availability of manpower. 21 Handbooks were published in FY 67, seven of which were initial ones on African countries; the other 14 were updates of previously published Western Hemisphere Handbooks. There appears no reason to expect any increase in Western Hemisphere production,

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and only a limited program for updating the African Country Handbooks is under consideration so we estimate that somewhere around 20 Handbooks will be published in FY 68. Production time for updating has varied widely among analysts (from 6 hours to over a week), with 3 - 4 days seemingly a fair average. Professional manpower required, therefore, will be about 1/3 of a man-year. Typing is a minor problem involving no more than 2 hours per Handbook.

5. OCI Research Papers--An arbitrary figure of 1/2 a professional man-year has been allocated to this category, since its cost are particularly difficult to estimate on an annual basis. Nine OCI research papers have been published since the formal beginning of the program in May 1964; most of the actual production was concentrated in FY 1965; for FY 1967 less than 1/3 a professional man-year could fairly be allocated. For FY 1968, the assignment of [ ] from DD/P to OCI for one year commencing 5 September would mean 3/4 a professional man-year, on this count alone--if indeed Bennett is chargeable to the OCI budget.

#### 6. Summary Table

Category	Manpower Expended (in man-years)	
	Professional	Non-professional
NIS Sections	35 - 36	5 - 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
NIS Factbook	1/3	*
OCI Country Handbooks	1/3	*
OCI Research Papers	1/2	*
Overhead	8	1
Total	44 - 45	6 - 6 $\frac{1}{2}$

\*minor amounts

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